Re-examination of the Failure of Buffalo Creek Dam, West Virginia on February 26, 1972

Following the failure of Buffalo Creek Dam on February 26, 1972, the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines contracted with W.A. Wahler & Associates (Wahler) to complete a comprehensive assessment of the failure [4]. Wahler integrated data that had been collected by the US Corps of Engineers [1] and the US. Geological Survey [3]. Wahler performed a thorough program of surface mapping, subsurface exploration and sampling, field and laboratory testing and engineering analyses to attempt to establish the root cause of the failure. Data from the field investigations was gathered from March through September 1972, and the final report by Wahler was issued in February 1973.
The investigation identified that both piping and mass stability were contributing factors to the dam failure. While a contributing factor, piping was judged not to be the primary cause of the collapse of the dam. Instead, a massive slide developed in the upper dam and ultimately a breach developed by progressive action. The Whaler report describes the materials involved in the failure process acting as a semi-viscous fluid because of high internal pore water seepage pressures.
For this paper, the postulated failure mode for the dam has been reexamined considering current technology related to shear strength and the potential for static liquefaction of low density (contractive) materials. Changes in water pressures in the foundation of the Upper Dam No. 3 occurring because of the rapidly rising water levels in the pool behind the dam during heavy rains likely triggered the development of the failure mode. The failure has been compared to other stability/liquefaction failures that have occurred since that time to establish common traits and characteristics.